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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 2, 1973

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Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger
Executive Assistant to
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Larry:

In response to Marshall Wright's request of November 1, the Committee agreed to send a copy of Secretary Kissinger's testimony of October 31 to you for the personal use of the Secretary. This copy is to be returned to the Committee within ten days, no copies are to be made of the transcript, and it is not to be circulated within the Department.

I was instructed to send the transcript directly to you.

I would be glad to explain the reasons for the Committee's sensitivity in sending copies of its executive transcripts outside the Committee if you feel that necessary.

Sincerely yours,



Carl Marcy

DOS and DOE reviews
completed.

CM:mmmm

Enclosure

CC: The Honorable Marshall Wright
Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations
Washington, D. C.

The United States Senate

CS-HK-1173

Report of Proceedings 3 OF 3

Hearing held before

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Wednesday, October 31, 1973

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T SSTATEMENT OFPAGE

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
The Secretary of State

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BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Wednesday, October 31, 1973

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., in Room S-116, The Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, Muskie, McGovern, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy and Griffin.

Also present: Senators Johnston, Huddleston, Nelson, Haskell, Abourezk and Hathaway.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones and Mr. Dockery and Mrs. McLaughlin of the Committee Staff.

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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State to commune with us about his recent activities.

Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A.

KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Kissinger. I don't have a statement, Mr. Chairman; I leave it entirely up to you whether you want me to make a few informal remarks or whether you propose to ask questions.

The Chairman. Perhaps the best way is to give us an informal background, and I wish to pursue a subject, we all have subjects we wish for a few minutes. There will be a lot more here, they are all tardy.

Secretary Kissinger. If the Chairman and gentlemen will let me discuss briefly some of the principles we have followed and where we are and where we expect to go from here.

You gentlemen remember the meeting at the end of the first week of the crisis, and, therefore, I won't go over the events of that week in detail except to sum up again what the basic principles were which we tried to follow throughout the events of the last two and a half weeks.

First, we wanted to bring about cessation of hostilities as rapidly as possible.

Secondly, we wanted to bring cessation about under

1 conditions in which we would have the maximum opportunity to
2 play a constructive role after the cease fire in the move
3 towards a durable and lasting peace.

4 Three. We wanted to maintain and use constructively the
5 relationships on which we believe the peace of the world will
6 ultimately depend, which is on the one hand our relationship
7 with our European allies and on the other hand our relation-
8 ship with the other great nuclear power, and we wanted to
9 avoid events from sliding towards a confrontation that might
10 have incalculable consequences.

11 Finally, we have always been committed to the survival of
12 Israel and to the maintenance of its security. These were
13 the principles we followed throughout the crisis.

14 During the first week we were confronted with a situation
15 of a beginning Soviet airlift into the area. That began on
16 Wednesday of that week. Some initial Arab successes of the tide
17 of battle turned on the Syrian front and a sort of stalemate
18 developed on the Sinai front.

19 We made major efforts during the first week to bring about
20 a cease fire in place and we thought this -- I presume this is
21 an executive session.

22 The Chairman. This is an executive session, everybody
23 understands that.

24 Secretary Kissinger. We had made an arrangement, we had
25 negotiated with the Soviets about a cease fire in place in

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which some other countries in the United Nations would put a security council, would put forward the cease fire to the Soviet Union, we would abstain and the majority vote would develop and we had been given to understand that the Egyptians would then accept the cease fire. This was at the time that I met you gentlemen on the Friday of that week. This is what we thought would happen on Saturday.

While this was going on we were very restrained in our supplies to Israel. We just permitted a few planes to come here to pick up really token equipment because, as you know, Senator, passenger planes can't really carry a great deal of equipment. I think there were only three plane loads that went during that first week.

On the Saturday of that week, that is the day after I met with this committee, the cease fire which we thought we had arranged fell apart for a variety of reasons, one of which was the refusal of the British to introduce the resolution.

Another one was the refusal of the Egyptians to go along with it.

The Israelies were prepared to go along with it at that point.

Senator Case. Which one was this?

Secretary Kissinger. A cease fire in place of resolution

October 13.

1 Senator Case. The thing they are hasseling about going
2 back to the line now?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That was not the case then. In
4 fact, at that time we were in the fortunate position there was
5 a straight line on every front. At that point we were faced
6 with a continuing massive Soviet airlift into the area and
7 an inability to bring about a cease fire, and the Israeles
8 running out of amunition to a point where their airplanes were
9 ordered to land with unexpended amunition, testifying that
10 bombs were more important than airplanes and, therefore, we
11 felt we had no choice except to start a substantial airlift
12 of our own.

13 During this whole period we were in constant touch with,
14 as I told you at our last session with each of the Arab
15 capitals, with the Soviet Union, with our West European
16 allies, despite the stories that are now being spread, which
17 I will come to in a minute, and with the Soviet Union.

18 Our reasoning in starting the airlift was it was an
19 absolute necessity. Without the airlift Israel probably would
20 have collapsed, and because it was running out of amunition.

21 Secondly, since we could not get the agreement either
22 of the Egyptians, the Soviets or the West European allies to
23 promote a cease fire in the United Nations under the condi-
24 tions that existed, we felt that until a military balance
25 was re-established no one would talk to us and we, therefore,

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tried to bring about a restoration of the military situation
as rapidly as we could, offering constantly to the Soviet
Union and to our West European allies our readiness to support
a cease fire in the United Nations as soon as a consensus could
be developed in the United Nations.

Throughout this crises we made a great effort to use the
Security Council as the forum where the settlement would take
place, and the only reason, as I told you when we met last
time, why we did not introduce a resolution of our own was
because we did not want to get a crystalization of lines before
there was any consensus that had formed, but every day we
talked to the Secretary General and to the key members to see
whether we could crystalize a consensus behind the Security
Council resolution.

I had a very long conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday
night, the 13th, when we started the airlift, and said we
were really coming to a critical point, that if we could not
work together on bringing this war to a conclusion, then
Soviet-American relations would, the whole concept of detonate
would be difficult and then we would be driven step by step
by the rivalries in the area into confrontations which could
not be in the interest of world peace or in the interest of our
two countries or in the interest of the area. And Dobrynin
said to me at that time that he considered that conversation
so important that he reported it verbatim to Moscow.

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The Chairman, with whom I tried to stay in the closest contact during this --

The Chairman. You did.

Secretary Kissinger. -- crisis, and to whom I gave almost I would say daily reports, sometimes several times a day, took the important step of himself calling Dobrynin with a similar message, without endorsing individual steps, but simply pointing out that we were at an important point.

As a result of this the Soviet leaders on Monday morning -- that would have been October 15 -- informed us that they were going to make another effort to bring the war to a conclusion and they were sending Kosygin to Cairo, they said they would not beat the propaganda drum about our airlift and they asked us not to justify it on anti-Soviet grounds in order to keep the temperature down while they were engaged in an airlift -- which we did.

Kosygin left for Cairo on the morning of October 16 and stayed there for three days. I won't go through all of the exchanges that took place during that week between ourselves, our allies, the Arabs and Israel, and our theme to the Arabs daily was please remember you will need to deal with us after the war is over and, therefore, keep yourself from taking irrevocable steps, and on the whole the Arabs, while they put on certain oil embargos did not engage in the sort of anti-American campaign throughout the Arab world that

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happened in the 1967 crisis.

Now, of course, we were in the closest contact with the Israelies. The battle turned about the 17th or 18th. Kosygin returned to Moscow on the evening of the 18th. On the evening of the 18th we received a Soviet proposition which, however, was not yet acceptable. It called for a cease fire, it did not call for negotiations, and it called for an Israelie withdrawal to the 1967 borders, which was pretty much the program.

We told the Soviets that we would have a counter proposal within 24 hours and we would let them know by Friday evening what our response would be.

I am being very detailed and I hope we can keep the secrecy.

During the day on Friday, we received a letter from Brezhnev which said we are at the point of having to make some irrevocable decision and we have to decide whether to go one way or another and my colleagues would, therefore, appreciate it very much, it is addressed to the President, if you could send the Secretary of State to Moscow for urgent consultations designed to speed an end of the war.

We asked whether Gromyko could instead come here. We were told no, they had to make these decisions collectively, that Kosygin was just back from Cairo and they would appreciate it if we came to Moscow.

Under those conditions the President then decided to

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 send me to Moscow where I had very extensive --

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true or
 is it true that it was so urgent that it was stated that it
 was not a matter of days but a matter of hours?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct, that is exactly
 right, Senator. It said it is not just a question of days,
 we have to make our decisions in a question of hours.

We knew that some of the airborne divisions were on alert
 and we felt after again close consultation with the Israeli
 government, we felt that we should respond and the President
 therefore sent me. I left at midnight that night, arrived
 in Moscow the following evening, Moscow time, immediately
 went into a five-hour session with Brezhnev, which was
 extremely emotional on his side. We met again the next day
 for six hours and came up with the Security Council resolution
 338 which had the following three parts.

One, immediate cease fire in place.

Two, a call for the implementation of Security Council
 242, which had been accepted by all of the parties six
 years earlier.

And, three, call for the immediate negotiation between
 the parties under appropriate auspices to bring about a just
 and durable peace.

Of those three provisions, only the first are really
 operative provisions. The first for cease fire in place and

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the third for negotiations among the parties.

Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967 precisely because it could be interpreted by each party in its own way. It calls in effect for a just and durable peace in secure and recognized borders and anyone can interpret exactly what it means. He does better than anyone has yet been able to do in the history of these negotiations. But it is a sort of a code word on which all parties could unite.

The most significant part was the third part of that resolution. For 25 years the Arabs had refused to sit down with the Israelis in face to face negotiations. Even the road settlement which established the State of Israel was achieved by indirect negotiations in which Ralph Bunche moved between the parties and in the same group but they never met face to face.

Now, the Arabs will be committed to face to face negotiations with the Israelis under appropriate auspices, which probably we believe will be under UN sponsorship with the United States and Soviets playing the principal role. The reason being that this is the sponsorship that is most acceptable to all of the parties. If we had the whole Security Council, the Chinese will move to the left of the Russians, the British and French will move between us and the Russians, and the permanent members are going to spend more of their time fighting among each other than making a constructive contribution,

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and by the consent of everybody so far there have been no dissents. We and the Soviet Union are going to provide the auspices for this negotiation.

That has been a very significant step forward.

Now, then, what about the event since then? If this war had ended the way normal wars end, all of the attention would then have moved from the cease fire to the implementation of the third part of the resolution, that is to say, to the direct negotiations. Unfortunately what happened was that the Israelis had broken through the center part of the Egyptian line and had captured a big slice of the West Bank so that the war ended with the Israeli-Egyptian armies toward the line of communication of each other.

On October 22, after the cease fire went into effect, after the cease fire went into effect, the cease fire was broken for reasons which we can no longer determine, each side claiming the other side had broken it, but there is no dispute about the fact that it was the Israelis who scored the major gains after the cease fire was broken and the major gain consisted of the Israelis cutting the last line of communication of the Egyptian third army on the East Bank of the Sinai so that 30,000 Egyptians found themselves in a trap which was completed after the cease fire went into effect, and last week almost all of the maneuvering that went on last week concerned the fate of the third army and the attempts to induce

1 the Israelis to go back to the line of October 22, wherever
2 that line might have been, but wherever the line was it was not
3 across the last road.

4 We took the position that in principle the cease fire
5 should be re-established, that it was hard to determine where
6 the line was but we could not refuse a Security Council call
7 for restoration of a cease fire line that we had been instru-
8 mental in establishing.

9 During the week we were deluged with increasingly menacing
10 Soviet notes, including one, there were a number of other
11 indicators. Seven out of eight of the Soviet airborne divi-
12 sions were put on alert. An airborne command post was
13 established in Southern Russia. The number of ships in the
14 Mediterranean went up, the Soviet ships went up to 98. A
15 naval flotila was heading for Egypt. Then we received an
16 extremely menacing letter on Wednesday night. It was in these
17 circumstances that we felt a menacing letter that had a dead-
18 line on it, unfortunately, that we felt we had to take certain
19 precautionary military measures.

20 This situation was resolved the next day when the Soviet
21 Union agreed that military contingents of the major countries
22 should not be sent to Egypt. Since then we have stood down
23 the alert and we are back to trying to promote the cease fire.

24 We have started in the meantime very actively diplomacy
25 with all of the parties.

1 As you know, Golda Meir is coming here tomorrow. The
2 Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt has been here for three days.
3 I have had extensive conversations with him on two problems.
4 One, how to make effective the cease fire that was established
5 and how to bring about a solution to what has become the
6 Egyptian third army problem.

7 Secondly, how to begin the process of negotiations to
8 lead to a permanent settlement.

9 This morning we will announce that next week on my way
10 to Peking I will stop in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
11 Iran and Pakistan, in order to begin the American participation
12 in the diplomatic effort to bring about a just and durable
13 peace.

14 I must say I will go into this in somewhat greater length
15 in response to your questions. We have had rather good talks
16 with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, which are not yet com-
17 pleted, by which showed some awareness of the fact of the
18 Israeli problem with respect to the third army and some willing-
19 ness to work it out and on a realistic basis.

20 We have not completed these talks yet but so far they have
21 gone well.

22 Let me make a few fundamental points.

23 First, where are we in the Mid East, where are we in
24 relation with the Soviet Union and where are with relation to
25 Western Europe?

1 First , where are we in the Middle East? We have, of
2 course, this nerve racking problem of the third army and of the
3 maintenance of the cease fire. I say the nerve-racking problem
4 because unfortunately when the Middle Easterns wake up it is
5 just after midnight in the United States and they all seem to
6 have an enormous compulsion to communicate with us at this
7 precise moment and it is the Middle East torture test because
8 it comes every 25 minutes. Just as you begin to doze off
9 somebody else will come in with a message or telephone call
10 each of which is characterized by total inability to see any-
11 body else's point of view except his own. But what these phone
12 calls illustrate is something of great political and strategic
13 significance for the United States.

14 We have come out of this war with all of the agony and
15 anguish as the only country in touch with all of the parties.
16 We have come out of this war as the only country that can
17 bring about a permanent solution to the Middle East and all
18 of the participants in the Middle East, whether they like us
19 or hate us, have realized the elemental fact that they must
20 deal with us and, therefore, there is not one faction in the
21 Middle East right now from the most radical to the most con-
22 servative that has not sent emissaries or messages to us and
23 that is not willing to listen to us. This gives us a great
24 responsibility and a great opportunity, a responsibility which
25 is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Arabs are not

1 looking for active policy but for a miracle, and they con-
2 stantly ask us to deliver their ultimate aim as the first
3 stage in the process, but this is tactics in terms of the
4 opportunity we have. It is an unusually fluid situation in
5 which we are expected for the sake of everybody to play a
6 major role and, therefore, with all of the agony that is going
7 on right now about the cease fire, we believe that we can
8 move into a very constructive place.

9 In fact, one of the difficulties in this situation is
10 that the Soviets realize that the Arab perception of what has
11 happened must be that the Soviets can get the hardware but
12 only we can get them a solution and, therefore, the Soviets
13 have a tendency to try to piggy back on what we may be doing
14 anyway.

15 On the other hand, they are a great power and we must
16 not give them the sense that we are squeezing them and beyond
17 out of the area because then they will do more drastic things.

18 So in terms of the Middle East situation we have a great
19 opportunity if there is statesmanship on all sides and if
20 the Israelis and Arabs realize that there must be a compro-
21 mise, that it is impossible to have a lasting peace if every-
22 body insists on the satisfaction.

23 As this diplomacy develops I would appreciate the oppor-
24 tunity to meet with you gentlemen because we will need a great
25 deal of public support to manage this.

1 Now, about relationships with the Soviet Union.

2 There was a great eagerness on the part of many commen-
3 tators to announce the end of detonate to see this in terms
4 of a permanent confrontation. I think we have to look at the
5 situation in terms of the lasting interests of the world.

6 Why is detonate with the Soviet Union important. Not
7 because we are friends, not because we have compatible politi-
8 cal systems, not because we have parallel interests, precisely
9 because we have incompatible ideologies, precisely because we
10 have different political interests, but because we are the
11 possessors of nuclear arsenals that can destroy humanity and
12 we have an obligation to this generation and to future genera-
13 tions so to manage our relationships that we can lift from
14 the world to the greatest extent possible the danger of a
15 nuclear confrontation. So it is precisely because we have
16 different interests and precisely because they have a different
17 political system that the need for detonate becomes important.

18 When this crisis started the Chairman and I happened to
19 appear on the same platform and I spoke before he lacerated
20 me and I pointed out that the United States objectives in the
21 detonate were the ones that I have indicated here, that we
22 would resist foreign policy of the Soviet Union or attempting
23 to use the detonate for weakening our alliances or exacerbating
24 tensions, but that there were limits beyond which we could not
25 go, including the manipulation of its domestic structure.

1 But this is a discussion you will probably wish to have
2 with me at some other time.

3 Now, in the Middle East the fact is that we were allied
4 indirectly, not formally, but in effect to Israel. The
5 Soviet Union had vested interests and vested friendships with
6 the radical Arab countries. They were no more willing to give
7 up those interests than we were willing to give up our interests
8 with relation to Israel. So the question is not did the Soviet
9 Union do things to exacerbate the radical Arabs, the question
10 is did they and we manage our relations through most of this
11 period in such a way as to avoid confrontation to use our
12 influence to cool matters and, finally, to bring matters to a
13 conclusion.

14 I would have to say that we did and it was the detonate
15 that brought it about.

16 Now, last week, what last week proved is that there is
17 a point beyond which detonate as yet does not contain matters
18 and that when the Soviets saw an Egyptian army trapped and being
19 pushed into surrender under conditions of a cease fire that
20 they helped to arrange, they lost their cool and they then
21 made threats they should not have made and took military
22 measures they should not have made and we responded so strongly
23 because we felt our only chance was to get this thing under
24 control very quickly and that we could not measure our response
25 with an eye dropper under those conditions. But what we have

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1 to be careful now is not to take the events of one night or
2 one day and make them the pattern of relationships with the
3 Soviet Union.

4 The President, Dobrynin and I met yesterday evening and
5 we all agreed that we have to, that what happened last week,
6 however it happened, should be treated as an aberration and
7 that we should try to work again cooperatively towards a peace-
8 ful solution. We believe very strongly, as I said in my press
9 conference, that if for any reason this Administration does
10 not solve the problem the next one will have to settle it or
11 the one after that. We cannot accumulate nuclear arsenals on
12 both sides without attempting to bring peace and this is what
13 our view of the detonate is about. It has no illusions about
14 Soviet purposes. We will resist Soviet aggressive moves but
15 we will also seize every opportunity to work constructively
16 with them.

17 Now about Europe. In the relationship with our West
18 European allies we went through a rather dramatic period and
19 it would be comforting if we could say the Administration
20 made five or six definable mistakes. I would say it would
21 be comforting because we could remedy those mistakes and deal
22 with them. But such has not been the case.

23 As you gentlemen know, we have attempted for six months
24 to get a joint statement of principle with our European
25 allies whose primary motive was not to get a great negotiating

1 asset but to get some emotional content to the Atlantic
2 relationship 25 years after it was established under one set
3 of conditions and try to adapt it to conditions which would
4 no longer be so primarily military in nature. That process
5 has gone much more slowly than we had hoped and has taken some
6 odd forms in which the Europeans, for example, would refuse to
7 put the word partnership in an Atlantic declaration which is
8 almost inconceivable to us.

9 I will be prepared to go into that in detail with you
10 some other time.

11 What was our problem with the Europeans during this
12 crisis? Our problem had nothing to do with the alert. Our
13 problem had to do with the fact that once the war started,
14 one of the big problems was to strengthen those elements
15 in the Soviet Union who were looking for a peaceful evolution
16 and not those who thought there were opportunities for adventures.
17 It was in the common interest to prevent an outcome in which
18 the radical Arab states would be so strengthened that they
19 would undermine all of the moderate states and that, therefore,
20 the oil supply to the non-Communist world would be controlled
21 by the most radical elements in the Arab world. It had
22 nothing to do anymore at that point with the details of where
23 the borders of Israel and the Arab States were. The Euro-
24 peans were infinitely more vulnerable to these pressures than
25 we were and at that point whatever mistakes we might have made

1 before 1973, a rapid outcome of the war followed by a rapid
2 negotiation, was at least as much in the European interest as
3 in ours.

4 Now, it is said that we did not consult adequately with
5 the Europeans, and I don't want to waste time here, but I have
6 a 12-page memorandum which just lists all of the consultations
7 we had with the Europeans. Now whether that was absolutely
8 enough I don't want to argue.

9 We had a three-day session at the NATO Council on the
10 Middle East crisis. We informed the NATO Council of every key
11 decision we made.

12 I have here just the telephone calls I made to Lord
13 Cromer and they were never less than one a day and sometimes
14 as many as three a day during this crisis. And the major
15 difficulty was shown by the fact that, for example, when we
16 tried to get the British to put forward a cease fire resolu-
17 tion in the UN they would not do it on the ground that the
18 Arabs might not like it. All we were asking them to do was
19 a simple cease fire resolution which at that time would have
20 kept both sides of the Canal in Egyptian hands, so it was not
21 unfavorable to the Arabs and the Israelis told us they would
22 accept it. This we could not get out of them. We had long
23 talks with the French and each European country with the
24 exception I regret to say of Portugal, when the airlift
25 started, refused us over flight rights, refused us the use of

1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6 with what
2 was after all an extremely risky effort for us.

3 It is not true that we did not tell the Europeans about
4 the alert. We were faced with a problem that we received the
5 Brezhnev letter at 10:30 at night, we thought that in the
6 light of all of the alerts that the Soviets themselves had
7 taken during the day if they were going to act they were going
8 to act in the morning Middle East time, so we had very little
9 time to react on our own to head them off.

10 We immediately informed the British on the theory that
11 they could help us in the NATO Council. We informed the NATO
12 Council at the precise hour that we responded to the Soviets.
13 We informed the military committee of NATO and we informed their
14 ambassadors here then during the day.

15 Now it was an emergency situation and there could not be
16 detailed consultation about what we would do ahead of time.

17 Now I don't want to castigate the Europeans because I
18 would like to stress that it is the Administration's view and
19 remains the Administration's view that the Atlantic Alliance
20 remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy and we still
21 believe that if the Democracies can not develop a unified policy
22 in the face of the challenges they now confront then perhaps
23 the Western World is going to go the way of the Greek City
24 states. It is not a question of resisting military threats
25 primarily, it is a question of looking at the world which we

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approaches rather than to consume ourselves in every crisis
in these desperate attempts to gain any little advantages which
are to the disadvantage of everyone, and we decided I must say
with a bleeding heart and not with any anger to point out
to the Europeans that it was important for all of us to face
the fact that this sort of behavior on either side of the
Atlantic was simply not adequate anymore.

We had to be able to define for each other what we all
wanted in the Middle East and that when one of the allies thinks
that when we acted in what we thought was the common interest,
that a little more understanding of our position was called
for. This is the basis for our complaint.

I do not draw from this conclusion that the Atlantic
Alliance is dead, that it should be altered. We do call, how-
ever, attention to the fact that the dialogue which we asked
for earlier this year is urgently necessary and that both sides
of the Atlantic have the responsibility in overcoming the short
term and asking themselves where it is that the democratic
nations really want to go.

We believe that this dialogue can go forward, we will
encourage it and we will do it as one of our principal foreign
policy objectives in the months ahead.

So this is where we are in our relations with the principal
parts of the world and I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, I have spoken

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1 a little longer than I had planned.

2 The Chairman. No.

3 Secretary Kissinger. I will be delighted to answer any
4 questions.

5 The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think you have given a
6 very enlightening analysis, particularly the last part of it,
7 an explanation of your objectives.

8 I propose that we will limit it to the ten minutes. I
9 will start and then we will go around to the membership.

10 If you would enlarge a little bit on the importance of the
11 detonate which you have talked so much about. The reason
12 I concentrate on this, I know others will ask other questions,
13 is I think it is in this area that the Congress either has
14 been or maybe may create difficulties for you in working
15 out the settlement, the permanent settlement.

16 As I understand it, your next objective is this negotia-
17 tion for a permanent settlement somewhere along the lines
18 of the principles of the '67 resolution, if I understand you
19 correctly.

20 Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

21 The Chairman. And I think I have noted a disposition
22 to, as you have stated, not only by commentators but members
23 of Congress to assume that you cannot with the Russians. If
24 you would pursue that a little bit for the moment the impor-
25 tance of that and hopefully give us some indications as to

1 what you think. I know the Executive takes the views it is
2 not your business to tell Congress what to do, but I don't ask
3 it in this spirit but simply an explanation of the fact, and
4 let us draw our own conclusions as to what our action should
5 be. But I feel there is a misapprehension about this particu-
6 lar aspect of it and I think, if I understand you correctly,
7 it is fundamental to a successful negotiation, you will need
8 in a negotiation the continued cooperative attitude on the
9 part of the Soviet Union if the negotiations are to succeed.

10 Would you elaborate a bit on that because I think it does
11 bear upon the attitude of the Congress.

12 Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

13 First, let us go back to the period before the outbreak
14 of the war. We had developed over a period of years, after
15 about two and a half years of confrontation with the Soviet
16 Union, we had moved into a more cooperative relationship which
17 for a long time had wide bipartisan support. This support
18 began to be weakened not so much on a partisan basis but
19 I will be very frank, through a curious coalition of individuals
20 of some of the radical liberal elements joining forces with
21 the conservatives being supported on specific issues by the
22 Jewish community, especially on the issue of immigration,
23 and on some other issues by labor. So that you had for the
24 first time a consensus, an opposition going across the whole
25 spectrum not in a uniform manner but still in a rather wide

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1 way of the most desperate motives. Now, this consensus could
2 only be held together in a way by raising all sorts of issues
3 and by almost trading off each group's grievances against the
4 others so that a broad scale attack developed and Dobrynin
5 at a lunch with me a week before this crisis started said
6 look at our position in Moscow, we are supposed to be in a
7 period of detente and yet we are now receiving more criticism
8 in the United States than we ever have at the height of the
9 cold war because the newspapers and the groups that use to
10 oppose the cold war are now attacking us and there is almost
11 no counter weight to this developing pressure. And this is
12 a very real problem.

13 There was I must tell you candidly in my view a tendency
14 to take the stemming stability so much for granted people
15 were beginning to try to draw interest on it and start pressing
16 on issues that were important but not central to the question
17 of nuclear war such as the fate of particular individuals
18 in the Soviet Union.

19 That was the atmosphere that existed. Nevertheless,
20 from the beginning of the Middle East crisis there were
21 exchanges between us and the Soviet Union, which even though
22 they did not necessarily bear fruit immediately, which were
23 of a comprehensiveness and detail that I did not think were
24 possible, they never happened in any previous Administration.

25 Secondly, the Soviet press and propaganda during this

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whole period never attacked the United States.

Now, if the Soviet propaganda organs had been unleashed against the United States we could have had riots in every Arab capitol around the world and American interests could have been jeopardized far beyond what they are today.

Thirdly, in the United Nations we managed to maintain an atmosphere in which even up to now, even with this whatever

it was last week, confrontation, test, or whatever you want to call it, even then there has never been any invective of either side against the other. And, fourthly, it will be

impossible to get a settlement in the Middle East if the Soviet Union takes the position, most radical position they

will be able to prevent a settlement in the Middle East because no Arab country can be less Arabic than Moscow and

Soviet cooperation is absolutely essential, because if you ask yourself what is the intellectual structure of a peace

settlement in the Middle East, it will have to be the Israelis will have to give up some on their insistence on security.

They cannot hold every square inch of territory they have conquered over the last 25 years, but the Arabs cannot insist

on getting an entrance price into the negotiation their total demand handed over to them as a question of principle and

there have to be guarantees developed and adjustments made in which hopefully we will use our influence with the Israelis,

Soviets will use their influence with the Arabs, and both

1 of us together with whoever else is willing will guarantee
2 the outcome.

3 If the Soviets move into a position of hostility toward
4 us in this, it is not so much toward us, it can keep that pot
5 boiling until there is no solution at all and, therefore, we
6 do attach great importance to maintaining a civil relation-
7 ship with the Soviet Union during this crisis. There is a
8 price neither country has been willing to pay. We are not
9 willing to give up Israel, the Soviet is not willing to give
10 up its position in the Arab world and, therefore, within these
11 constraints we have been drawn into opposing views. They have
12 to be mitigated. But we believe that detonate must be
13 re-established, if it has been weakened, and we believe that
14 really those of you gentlemen who have expressed some concerns
15 about it, that we have been unilaterally victims of detonate
16 should really be carefully examined. Except if you ask your-
17 selves what exactly have we paid for the detonate? We managed
18 to end the war in Vietnam, whatever you may think about it,
19 under the conditions that we set, and we do not have to debate
20 whether those are adequate conditions. We settled most of the
21 European problems. We have made a beginning towards arms con-
22 trol. We are now in negotiations on mutual force reductions
23 in Europe. All of these are in the mutual benefit. The wheat
24 deal, which is often mentioned, has nothing to do with detonate.
25 The wheat deal has to do with a total misconception on the

1 part of United States about its position, about how much wheat
2 we had. The conviction of the Agricultural Department that we
3 could never sell enough wheat and the nature of our domestic
4 market in which the companies were not exchanging information,
5 so that we had no idea of the scale of the exchange. As a
6 matter of fact, wheat was never discussed at the Moscow summit
7 in 1972.

8 I go into this so we get in perspective who paid what for
9 the detonate.

10 I think the wheat deal was a horrible mistake but not for
11 detonate reason, maybe for the political reasons, maybe for a
12 lot of other reasons, but not for detonate reasons.

13 And what has been created from this I think is really
14 in the interests of the long term peace of the world and, as
15 I said on a number of occasions, it is essential if we are
16 going to have peace in the Middle East, and it is essential
17 if we are going to prevent all of the world's trouble spots
18 from being exacerbated. If the Soviets do not play that game
19 then we will resist them, but it will be to nobody's benefit
20 and sooner or later some generation will have to come along
21 hopefully before it is too late and solve that problem.

22 The Chairman. Could I just summarize, is it fair to say
23 you think this negotiation is in the interest of Israel as
24 much as anybody else?

25 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

1 The Chairman. If it succeeds. And since it is under
2 the Security Council it will revitalize the UN. That would
3 seem to be the conclusion that you could draw.

4 Secretary Kissinger. First about Israel. Israel has
5 gone through a traumatic experience. They live with the
6 belief in total military supremacy. They have emerged mili-
7 tarily victorious but at an enormous price. They have had casu-
8 alties which transposed to the American scene would be equiva-
9 lent to something like five to six hundred thousand in the
10 two-week period and they face the prospect any renewal of the
11 war, even if they win it, will from now on be a war of attrition
12 rather than the spectacular victories they gained in '56 and
13 '67. That in my view is going to be intolerable for Israel
14 in the long term. Whether they have yet realized this shock
15 of war and the eminence of an election I am not prepared to
16 say, but it is in long term interests of Israel to achieve
17 legitimacy or security through legitimacy and through inter-
18 national guarantees and we believe that we can bring about
19 this realization in Israel over a period of time in its own
20 interests.

21 The Chairman. Don't you think using the United Nations
22 is the beginning to restore it as a vehicle that the Soviet
23 Union and others can use?

24 Secretary Kissinger. I must say I had not in my academic
25 writing been a total supporter of the United Nations, as you

1 know, but I cannot imagine how we would have gotten through
2 the crisis of the last three weeks without the forum of the
3 United Nations. With all of its weaknesses, with many of
4 the self righteousness of the non-aligned nations, for example,
5 nevertheless it provided the buffer and legitimacy and pro-
6 vided the possibility, for example, of getting an expedition
7 and emergency force in their observers in there. We worked
8 very closely with the Secretary General. Take, for example,
9 this rather minor case of the Soviet Union informing us on
10 Thursday that they had sent 70 observers into the Middle East
11 and demanded that we also send 70 observers. The whole UN
12 observer force is only 280. That would have meant 50 percent
13 of the observer force would have been Soviet-American and we
14 have had introduced all of the great powers rivalries right
15 into the UN observer force.

16 The Soviets tried to pressure us to go along with this.
17 We said, finally we said whatever the Secretary General does,
18 we do what the Secretary General asks us to do, we won't
19 follow, just because you send 70 people in there does not
20 oblige us, let's get the Secretary General to ask for a force.
21 The Secretary General finally decided he would not accept
22 more from any of the super powers than the largest single
23 contingent if any other country in the UN force, which comes
24 out to about 30, and that is the compromise that is now being
25 developed. There was no way of solving this as a direct US-

1 Soviet confrontation and you accumulate these over a period of
2 time, so I have become really the UN I believe has played a
3 very important role in this.

4 The Chairman. Senator Sparkman.

5 Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, you have certainly
6 given us a very fine review. We tried our best to keep up with
7 it in the newspapers as we were going along.

8 I felt that it was a very fine accomplishment. I was
9 particularly pleased when I learned of the cooperation between
10 the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in those
11 resolutions in the United Nations. I found that most encour-
12 aging and I have felt very strongly that if that kind of
13 cooperative effort can be maintained we might be on the eve
14 of a peaceful arrangement, at least in the Middle East, and
15 I want to commend you for the tremendous job that you have
16 done in connection with that.

17 Secretary Kissinger. Thank you very much. There is one
18 thing about the UN cooperation. To the best of my information,
19 last week is the first time that the Soviet Union voted for a
20 United Nations emergency force. They have abstained on a
21 number of occasions and permitted it to happen but this is
22 the first time that they actively worked with the Secretary
23 General on a charter for an emergency force in a crisis area.

24 The Chairman. Hopefully they will help pay for it.

25 Secretary Kissinger. They will help pay for it.

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1 Senator Sparkman. That excluded personnel from the Soviet
2 Union?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

4 Senator Sparkman. As well as from the United States?

5 Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

6 The Chairman. Senator Case.

7 Senator Case. You have done a great job, including the
8 whole business of what we heard and all the rest. I said so
9 at the time and I am enormously happy about it as it has gone
10 so far. I only hope that your energy and your ability survive
11 the period in which you had this responsibility.

12 I share also your perception of the United Nation's use-
13 fulness and its limitations. Again this leads me to my first
14 point.

15 You obviously are more than an activist in this situation,
16 as has been true of our foreign policy people, State Depart-
17 ment and otherwise, for sometime, and I know you believe in
18 this kind of necessity for us to take a more active role in
19 bringing about a settlement. That requires, of course, an
20 enormous responsibility for seeing that basic terms of the
21 it make sense. All I can say is this rather obvious thing,
22 that I hope in spite of all the aspirations of everybody that
23 when Israel's borders are finally settled they are such that
24 she can maintain her own defense because in the past she would
25 have been wiped out three times if she had not done this and

1 I say this not because I think we are bound to do anything
2 more, but I think this is an obligation in the interest not
3 only of Israel but in the interest of humanity. This is not
4 something that we can leave to the will of the United Nations
5 peace keeping operation or of the future Security Council
6 willingness to go along, this is a very specific thing and I
7 don't mean adjustments do not have to be made, I know they
8 have. I wish you would comment on that.

9 Secretary Kissinger. We have not stated our view and we
10 do not now have a fixed view as to exactly where Israel's
11 borders should be. The Security Council resolution 242 pro-
12 vides for secure and recognized borders without giving any
13 criteria as to what a secure border is. But we certainly
14 believe that the borders of Israel should be secure.

15 Now how do you achieve security? This is what the negotia-
16 tions will depend upon. Absolute security for one country
17 means absolute insecurity for other countries, so there
18 always has to be a balance between the security needs of every-
19 body.

20 Secondly, the security depends in part on the location of
21 the frontiers, in part on how these frontiers, what the
22 military arrangements on these frontiers are, and, thirdly,
23 in part on what guarantees are given. For example, wherever
24 the frontiers are, I must tell you candidly the frontiers
25 have to be back a considerable distance from where they were

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when the war started, they cannot be on the Suez Canal and Sinai. Where exactly they should be, this is a question that the parties out to negotiate among each other. But if for example, there were on the Arab side of the frontier substantial demilitarized zones so that before the Arabs could launch any attack they would have to violate the demilitarized zone, that is one of the security features that has to be considered. Why, for example, did the Israelis lose control of the East Bank of the Canal? It is because the Arabs, because the Egyptians had accumulated so many surface to air missiles on their side of the Canal that the Israel air force could not operate and really could not operate in that area for about eleven days of the war. If there had been a substantial demilitarized zone along the Canal or along the Border, wherever that is, there would not have been surface to air missiles and, therefore, curiously enough the defense would have been easier, aggression would have been more difficult. These are the considerations.

We have no doctrinary view about pushing anybody to any particular frontier.

Senator Sparkman. Neither do I. I just want to make the point and I see you understand fully what I have in mind.

There are just two other things I would like to leave with you. One, it seems to me that it is maybe a blessing in disguise we have been faced with this energy crisis. I think

1 it has been insane we have allowed ourselves and the Western
2 World, even more the rest of the Western World even more to
3 get to the point where we are going to be dependent upon the
4 Middle East for energy and that the Israel-Arab conflict,
5 entirely apart, we should have come to a decision we were
6 not going to do this anymore, the idea of pouring billions of
7 dollars in the area, so as to be unable to spend it to do
8 anything with it as a means of our going ahead with our tech-
9 nology. It seems to me something we had to deal with and
10 we should make this occasion for that rather than in any sense
11 letting oil be an instrument for affecting American policy
12 as far as that goes. That is one point.

13 The second is, again I want to detonate as we all do, but
14 again quite apart from that, the whole question of Jews treat-
15 ment in Russia and all the rest, it seems to me very, very
16 important for us to accept the broad proposition and to work
17 on it, that we are never going to get permanent peace with the
18 totalitarian power that is going to be something we can rest
19 with unless inside that power there is some real ferment
20 itself among the intellectuals, among the academicians, among
21 the people in general who are capable of leadership roles,
22 if they are permitted to take it, and, therefore, for us to
23 let detonate be a means by which Russia expresses whatever
24 beginning of an opening there may be within Russia for this
25 kind of ferment and intellectual activity would be a very great

1 mistake on our part. Specifically we ought not to give
2 them technology, credits or anything else if it means that
3 they therefore have less need for reliance upon their own
4 resources as Solzhenitsyn and the other people have recently
5 written. It seems to me this general proposition makes great
6 sense and we ought to go very slow.

7 On the wheat deal, I think you are absolutely right, it
8 was a stupid mistake, it did not happen to be related to the
9 State Department view of its relationship with Russia, but it
10 was awfully stupid any way.

11 Secretary Kissinger. No question.

12 Senator Sparkman. But on these other matters of long
13 term credits, of technology, and of encouragement of this,
14 in circumstances that permit the Russians to express their
15 own intellectual resources and people, and clamp down harder
16 at home, it seems to me this very great question in the long
17 run whether we are serving any useful purpose.

18 Perhaps you would like to comment.

19 Secretary Kissinger. This, of course, is a very complex
20 issue.

21 Senator Sparkman. Of course.

22 Secretary Kissinger.. Which the Chairman and I had promised
23 ourselves we would discuss once formally before the committee.
24 This is, of course, a question whether the detonate leads to
25 an acceleration of repression in the Soviet Union. You can

1 make a case for the proposition that 20 years ago Sahkarov
2 and Solzhenitsyn would have been shot. Ten years ago Sahkarov
3 and Solzhenitsyn would never have been heard. Now Sahkarov
4 and Solzhenitsyn make long distance telephone calls to foreign
5 newspapers and state their opposition to the regime and
6 Solzhenitsyn claims about not being permitted to live in
7 Moscow but lives in Moscow without a permit now. It would be
8 better if he lived there with a permit but, nevertheless, lives
9 in Moscow. So you could make a case for the proposition that
10 a system which is oppressive, anyone who has been in Moscow
11 knows it is palatably oppressive, nevertheless, I think you
12 could make a better case for the proposition that its ferment
13 is increasing rather than decreasing and instead you can use
14 Sahkarov and Solzhenitsyn as symptoms of the inevitable pro-
15 cess which the ruling group in the Soviet Union will yield
16 to very reluctantly and very graciously.

17 Senator Sparkman. They will never do it voluntarily.

18 Secretary Kissinger. That is right. But one could make
19 a better case for the proposition as used to be made generally,
20 that under conditions of detonate that process is more likely
21 to accelerate than under conditions of foreign danger of
22 international conflict where the foreign danger can be used
23 as an excuse for international repression.

24 Now, on the relationship, but the long term credits
25 will really reduce the reliance of the Soviet system on its

1 own technologists. I think we should have a session sometime
2 of the committee on this whole problem.

3 Senator Sparkman. And there are other facets, too.

4 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, it is a very important issue.
5 Our view has been that there are two separate problems related
6 but not identical. First, is to moderate the foreign policy
7 confrontations that exist in the world and reduce the dangers
8 of nuclear war.

9 Secondly, to move from them to a more stable international
10 order in which it is not that we are mitigating confrontations
11 but making them more and more unthinkable.

12 For that second one, a greater combatant of domestic
13 structures is probably useful and maybe even essential, but
14 how to get this without ruining the first is the big issue.

15 The Chairman. Senator Mansfield.

16 Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take
17 too much time except to commend the Secretary and the Admini-
18 stration for its success in bringing about at least a tentative
19 cease fire and the possibility of further negotiations, and I
20 think a great deal of credit must be given for what has been
21 done and be given publicly as far as I am concerned, because
22 it made it possible for the nation, this nation, to avoid a
23 difficult choice and made it possible for some of us to avoid
24 a difficult personal choice. So I have nothing but words of
25 commendation and I am glad things have turned out the way they
have and I yield back the rest of my ten minutes.

The Chairman. Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend the Secretary who I think behaved brilliantly, and whatever may be the other troubles of the President, perhaps as we expect the President of the United States to behave in great international crises, taking great risk, but very prudent, I do not believe the United States over-reacted. I do not believe -- I think the Secretary put it correctly when he said you cannot measure that out with an eye dropper.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask you a question which is perhaps most fitting for me. Why is it to the interest of the United States to support Israel?

Secretary Kissinger. First of all, because we are committed to the freedom and independence of nations in general against foreign aggression and because we have opposed the resort to military power. Secondly, because whatever the origin of our attachment to Israel, it is now clear that in the Middle East and around the world it has become clear that we have had a special relationship with Israel and that for Israel to be submerged by Soviet arms in this conflict would have had consequences far beyond the Middle East, and this is what we saw as the danger of the radical countries relying on military power solving their problems, solving their problems by resort to force.

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1 It is for these reasons that we believe that the survival
2 and independence and security of Israel are important
3 and are in no sense incompatible with any legitimate aspirations
4 of any other nation in the area. And one can add to it
5 the following: That after 25 years all Arab states have
6 now practically accepted the fact that the existence of
7 Israel is no longer at issue. What is now at issue is
8 the frontiers of Israel, and that is an issue, that is
9 a problem to be settled by negotiations.

10 Senator Javits. At this time, in your judgment, is
11 the presence of Israel in that area, in the condition in
12 which she finds herself, that is great military effectiveness
13 but with the difficulty which you have described, a frictional
14 danger, helpful or harmful to the position of Europe and the
15 rest of the free world with respect to Middle East oil
16 supply. In other words, is Middle East oil supply more
17 or less likely to be materially disrupted by her presence
18 or her absence? You get an attitude for example, in some
19 quarters in Europe that they would just as soon see Israel
20 go down the drain and get the oil flowing.

21 Secretary Kissinger. When you have countries in a
22 monopoly position with respect to energy, as the Arab
23 countries are, it is unrealistic to assume that they would
24 not use that monopoly position regardless of whether
25 Israel exists or not.

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1 I have seen and you must have seen statistics where
2 the Saudis can cut oil production and raise prices and come
3 out ahead of where they were last year, which again, which
4 in turn was in excess of anything that they could possibly
5 spend.

6 This is one of the cardinal features of the period.

7 Now, one of the long term solutions is the one Senator
8 Case mentioned. We have to break the monopoly position of the
9 Arab countries on the oil supply of Western Europe and the
10 U. S. and we are going to submit an energy message in the
11 very near future which will be a first step in that direction.

12 I would say that any realistic Middle East policy has to
13 begin from the premise that Israel will exist and it is one
14 of the irresponsibilities of some of the European nations
15 to engage in this illusion.

16 Israel will exist. We cannot be part of the destruction
17 of Israel and, therefore, one has to operate within that
18 framework.

19 Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, may I suggest, too, that
20 the possibility of exploring the connection between oil
21 and food, you cannot eat oil, and the Arab masses must eat.
22 It is said that half the grain in the world available for
23 overseas consumption originates here or at least in the
24 North American continent and I would suggest that the

25 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16 : LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6 carefully.

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Is it fair to summarize what you say about Israel's presence in the Middle East by saying it is at least one influence which "keeps them honest" being in a monopoly position?

5 Secretary Kissinger. I must say that the Shah of Iran, for example, always used to consider the existence of Israel as vital to his own ability to conduct moderate policy in that area, and after all is the second largest oil supplier .

6
7
8
9 Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, moving to Europe, first I would like to endorse very strongly what Senator Case has said as chairing the Committee of Nine at the North Atlantic Assembly, which Senator Mansfield and I and Senator Sparkman just attended, it was very clear that even Europe as represented by its members on this committee believed that an element which would give an underwriting to detente is the degree of openness which exists in Eastern Europe, and may I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that some recollection be had in the records of the so-called Baruch-Hancock approach to the soviet Union which goes back a very long time, which was premised upon the theory that we would each move a step forward but that we would not move a step until the other side moved a step.

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21
22
23 For example, even on the so-called Jackson Amendment,

24 limitation, curtailment, conditioning, a string

1 by the Congress, must be explored very, very seriously.
2 Similarly, credits. I am pretty well oriented in business, in
3 banking, and credits depend on how long and at what rates,
4 and that is very, very flexible and I think again the Baruch-
5 Hancock theory was the carrot and the stick. We will gamble
6 with you for a year, two, or three, and if you do what
7 you ought to do we will go with you further, but we won't
8 until you do, until we see some performance. So I just
9 wonder whether or not that might not be a way in which
10 rather than the all or none theory, we have to go with them
11 because it will have some indirect effect upon easing matters.
12 Our policy might be directed toward getting more out of
13 detente and yet not in the process, I do not like to use
14 harsh words, but abandoning at least to some extent our
15 conscience.

16 Secretary Kissinger. Senator Javits, we could live with
17 an amendment that set out certain criteria for periodic review
18 and there were several compromises that were explored at
19 various stages that we could live with which say every three
20 years there should be a review of whether indeed some
21 progress has been made or a finding by the Executive which
22 then the Congress can review. Those are criteria that we
23 could live with.

24 What would be very difficult is if the attempt
25 to put the Soviet Union into a situation which after all it

1 had before 1951, and which is already enjoyed by over
2 a hundred other nations would lead to a Congressional prohi-
3 bition of that status in terms of very specific conditions
4 and lead to a decision to cut off credit, which is what
5 the present Jackson-Vanik amendment would in effect do.
6 If the amendment could be reformulated so it set down certain
7 criteria that it would have to be periodically reviewed
8 depending on the language, I think that might be a reasonable
9 compromise between the all or nothing positions of both sides.

10 Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

11 I had not gone into Europe with you, which I want
12 to do, but I hope there will be another opportunity.

13 The Chairman. Senator Church.

14 Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I would like to
15 add my voice to the chorus of praise for your efforts.
16 I have an idea of the kind of questions we would be
17 punishing you with if your efforts had not been blessed with
18 success.

19 In your exposition of the foundations for detente you
20 mentioned certain mutual interests that give us some
21 basis for conflicts, that is to say, our obvious mutual
22 interest with the Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear weapons
23 and the obvious mutual interests in the reduction of the
24 load we carry in Middle Europe, the resolution of the problems
25 in Middle Europe, which might have led to conflict.

1 But what is the mutual interest with respect to the
2 Middle East looking at it not from our standpoint but from
3 the Russian standpoint?

4 Do the Russians have as much reason to want a negotiated
5 settlement of this long standing and acrimonious dispute
6 of Israel and the Arab countries as we have?

7 Is it possible that though the Russians might want
8 a cease-fire because of the obvious danger of a spreading
9 war, that they would be less interested in securing a negotiated
10 settlement since the absence of that settlement is at least
11 one basis on which they have secured so much influence with
12 the Arab countries in this critical area of the world?

13 Secretary Kissinger. I think that is a very important
14 question. If you look at the Middle East as an isolated
15 area, you could make a good case for the proposition that
16 the best outcome for the Soviets is a continuation of
17 the status quo sort of an outbreak of the war. And indeed
18 the Soviet Union Strongly supported the creation of the State
19 of Israel partly for this precise objective, to put an
20 element of discord into the Middle East.

21 The motivation, there are three motivations that the
22 Soviet Union can have in moving toward a settlement.
23 First, its general interest in detente and the impossibility
24 of pursuing aggressive policy in the Middle East and
25 detente policies elsewhere because that we won't permit.

1 The second danger is that in every war so far the
2 Soviet Union has come out in a weaker political position in
3 the sense that all they have been able to do for the Arabs
4 is to mitigate the consequences of the Arab defeats which
5 were produced by the infusion of Soviet arms. They have never
6 yet achieved a complete benefit by their own efforts for the
7 Arabs. And the third reason is that a prolonged period of
8 diplomatic stalemate may turn the Arab frustrations
9 against the Soviet Union, as was shown already in 1972 when
10 Sudat evicted the Soviet advisers.

11 Those are the three motives of which perhaps the general
12 interest of the detente would be the greatest, but there
13 is a constant temptation, I hinted at before, basically, of
14 the Soviets to either take a free ride on the thing we are
15 doing or to put few obstacles in the way.

16 One of the problems, realistically the Arab countries
17 now have to come to us because we are the only ones that can
18 produce a settlement and that is more or less what is
19 happening, that is what the Egyptian Foreign Minister
20 really is doing here, and that is why they have been so
21 eager for me to visit Cairo. They have excessive expectations.
22 On the other hand, we must not take advantage of the
23 opportunity to a point where we squeeze the Soviets out
24 of the Middle East, then they will take a radical position,
25 frustrate whatever the Arabs may want to do for whatever

1 reason. This where we have to navigate but the temptation
2 for the Soviets to keep this thing going are definitely there
3 and we are trying to reduce them along the lines that
4 I gave.

5 Senator Church. As you know, in the early stage of the
6 war we talked about the need to supply, resupply Israel
7 for its losses, and I felt very strongly then that your
8 action was quite correct in maintaining a military equilibrium
9 at a time when the Arabs were pressing Israel very hard
10 and the Israelis were suffering very substantial losses
11 but I also feel that right as the policy has been up to now,
12 nothing would be more injurious to the interests of the
13 Israelis and to the interests of the Jewish community in
14 this country than an American involvement in a war in the Middle
15 East, should it break out again, and I think such an
16 involvement would be far more devisive and acrimonious
17 and internally far more dangerous to this country and its
18 well-being in the future than protracted involvement of this
19 country in Indo China.

20 What I am leading up to is this: I understand that the
21 amendment has been offered by Senator Hatfield in connection
22 with the supplemental bill that the Administration is
23 sending, has sent up , for \$2 billion to cover the cost
24 of the armament that we have sent into the Middle East.
25 I haven't read the Hatfield Amendment but I take it it is the

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same formula that was adopted by Congress in connection with Indo China. And my question to you is if this amendment takes that form it would prohibit the use of any funds contained in the bill for the purpose of introducing American forces into the Middle East without prior and express consent of the Congress.

What would the position of the Administration be on such an amendment?

Secretary Kissinger. Senator Church, the first time I heard of the Hatfield Amendment was on some news show this morning and I haven't read it. Let me reason off the top of my head. I think such an amendment would be a disaster. We have no intention of putting American forces in there, but if we had to conduct an alert last week under conditions where the Soviets would know that we would have to go to Congress before we could react, I think we might have seen those airborne divisions on the way.

One of the indicators we had, incidentally, that I had forgotten to mention was that, and Senator Symington will appreciate, is that all Soviet transports had stood down for two days, which meant they were assembling it someplace or at least gave themselves the option to use it.

Now, we have no intention of putting forces in there except under the most extreme circumstances that I am

would sustain. We have made an internal

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1 decision in the White House, I do not hesitate to
2 tell you, that if it were necessary to move forces last
3 week, we would have gone to Congress for its approval,
4 but to have this written in as a requirement now in this tense
5 situation would really in my view be very disastrous.

6 Senator Church. One final follow-up in that connection.
7 Because we have already had quite enough Presidential wars in
8 our time, what assurances could you give the committee that
9 no such action would be taken if we were to refrain from
10 writing into the bill an expressed provision of this kind?

11 Secretary Kissinger. Well, I have not formally discussed
12 this with the President. I can tell you that our view last
13 week was to go to the Congress if American military forces
14 had been moved in. We might have moved them in and then
15 go to the Congress. But this really would have depended
16 on how the situation evolved.

17 I would have thought that the agony of recent years
18 and indeed of this year should make clear that unilateral
19 Executive actions simply do not provide the basis for
20 public support that the great risks that are involved here
21 would bring about, but I would be glad to discuss this with
22 the President and give you a more formal assurance.

23 My worry, quite frankly, is if we make this very public
24 it might reduce the flexibility in a crisis situation. I cannot
25 now foresee a circumstance in which American forces would go

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in because I think the crisis is now de-escalating every
 day and hopefully out of the visit of the Egyptian Foreign
 Minister and the Prime Minister of Israel and my visit
 to Cairo we can get the cease-fire so firmly established
 then our primary discussions will be a peace settlement.
 I really do not think we will have another crisis.

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1 Secretary Kissinger. My concern right now is not to
2 keep the Congress being able to pass it, my concern is from
3 getting things on the public record that may rekindle incentives
4 that we thought we had squashed last week.

5 Senator Pearson. Frank led you to answer my question,
6 that is, whether or not the alert had moved as a necessary
7 response to intervention, whether or not it would have been
8 pursuant to the Middle East resolution, passed after '57,
9 or whether it would have been the Administration coming
10 back to Congress, and I think you responded.

11 Secretary Kissinger. Our intention was to go to the
12 Congress last week. There were many contingencies that were
13 hard to foresee but the basic intention was to go to the
14 Congress.

15 Senator Pearson. Well, I was also interested in your
16 itinerary on the trip to Peking and I want to ask you in that
17 connection whether or not Arab unity being of the nature that
18 it is, whether or not an agreement between the Israelis and
19 the Egyptians through the UN and the US and USSR participating,
20 whether or not the radical Arab countries, Syria, particularly,
21 their interest is of a nature to make this even more compli-
22 cated than it is? Are we going to be able to handle that
23 part of it? You apparently have that in mind with the
24 itinerary that you set forth.

25 Secretary Kissinger. Syria has not yet accepted

1 negotiations formally, although they have accepted the cease-
2 fire, including reference to Security Council Resolution 242
3 which they had never done before, either.

4 If a settlement can be arranged with Egypt then Jordan
5 will follow very quickly.

6 Senator Pearson. And Lebanon.

7 Secretary Kissinger. And Lebanon will follow very
8 quickly. That would leave Syria in an isolated position and
9 Syria by itself is not strong enough to start a war again.

10 And in addition Syria represents almost the most difficult
11 problem for the Israelis because of the Golan Heights issue.

12 So we are not eager to have Syria be the first Arab country which
13 has to be brought into this negotiation.

14 The logical--we think that if we can get a settlement
15 between Egypt and Israel and Jordan and Israel that this
16 will be enough to diffuse the Saudis who are really looking
17 for a way to get off the course on which they are, whether then
18 after the last radical state will join we are not yet clear.

19 Senator Pearson. My last question is, why was the response
20 by the Soviets so much really different from the '67 to the '73
21 war? Except for the very lightning result of the '67 war
22 there wasn't time enough perhaps to respond, but this time
23 you had resupplied during the conflict a signal to you it
24 was hours, not days, very abrupt, alert of the Soviet forces,
25 why in the spirit of this detente was reaction so much different

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1 then today than it was in '67 and is their view of detente
2 slipping? Where is Brezhnev now, given the collective
3 decisions?

4 Secretary Kissinger. In '67 the Soviets moved immediately
5 into a posture of public and very vocal hostility to us, not
6 only in their own propaganda but in the UN and contributed
7 to the fact that all Arab, not all Arab countries but many
8 Arab countires broke diplomatic relations with us at that time
9 and it took weeks until Kosygin came over here and met with
10 President Johnson for this to diffuse because the military
11 situation was quite different because the Israelis won so
12 rapidly.

13 This time in their relations with us they went to great
14 lengths to diffuse it and made several Efforts to bring about
15 a cease-fire. They were not the principal obstacle to the
16 cease-fire at the end of the first week on October 13, in fact,
17 they tried to cooperate with us on that, perhaps not as energeti-
18 cally as they should have, but we and they had worked out
19 a formula which failed because our West European allies
20 were not willing to run any risks with the Arabs and because
21 the Egyptians over-estimated their military position.

22 They then sent Kosygin into Cairo to try to get
23 a settlement, all of this before the Israeli victory became
24 obvious, and I must say when I was in Moscow it was a tough
25 negotiation, as it always is with them.

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We achieved substantially everything that the Israelis had ever asked from us, acceptance by everybody of 242, direct negotiations and cease-fire in place, which the Israelis had been willing to accept the week before under much less favorable conditions.

Now, events of last week you can interpret in part by their frustration in seeing their clients there wind up in a worse and worse position, and judging from the messages we got from the Egyptians, and if you assume they were even more vocal to the Russians, the Egyptians were in a state of near hysteria last week.

So I think you had many factors combining to produce the events of last week. We do not consider the Soviet behavior exemplary, far from it. They tried to get their advantages from the situation, but we think they moderated more and helped bring about a rapid settlement under conditions that were acceptable to all parties.

Senator Pearson. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask for your help. There were some things I did want to ask about, like the reason for the alert. You have answered that to my satisfaction.

The British and other European countries' total

discontent in our problems is something I would like to talk

1 about sometime with you further at your convenience, and
2 also I would like to know why the Israel intelligence,
3 supposedly the best, this time was very bad, as well as our
4 own intelligence. Knowing of your knowledge in the position
5 in the intelligence field, in the Security Council, I would
6 like to discuss that sometime at your convenience.

7 I would like to know why it is that we have not been
8 more effective presenting our problems that have been given
9 to you because of our additional interest with the Soviet
10 Union on other matters that do not have to do with Middle
11 East and the negotiations, how we can be of service in
12 developing that, and I would like to sometime find out why it
13 was that the Administration gave in on the original SALT
14 deal that you made in Moscow, which in my opinion means
15 that there will not be a meaningful SALT deal made in the
16 future in all probability especially because of the
17 philosophy and ideology of the new team that is operating
18 that situation and, of course, I am excepting you.

19 Now, getting down to the question that I am interested
20 in, in my opinion, and you do not need any commendations
21 from me, certainly, but I think your paragraph in your press
22 conference about the mutual danger to not only us and the
23 Soviet Union but also to the world is the most profound
24 constructive, thoughtful statement that has been made since
25 I have been in government, and I am going to take the liberty

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1 of sending to every member of the committee, in case
2 they missed it -- it was only a paragraph -- to me it is the
3 whole thing. Like four little fellows said to the fifth,
4 how would you like to shoot crap? He said, I can't do it for
5 six reasons. And what is the first reason? I haven't the
6 money., never mind the other five, you know. Because
7 you have got it all summed up so beautifully in that para-
8 graph.

9 Now, what I have been trying to do, and the Chairman,
10 I am afraid at times I have even bored him to get out the facts
11 of the nuclear picture. If people would only understand
12 it better. I made three talks in Missouri over the weekend.
13 I used the paragraph and people would come up and say, I
14 had no idea of the fact everything we dropped in four
15 years to win over Germany and Japan is 1/25th of one percent
16 of what we have ready to drop tomorrow. The fact that the
17 Hiroshima bomb with 14 kilotons, according to Dr. York
18 at this seminar you mentioned previously, killed one hundred
19 thousand people, 14 kilotons with one of our little fighters
20 out of Frankfort could drop 700 kilotons on Moscow and
21 get back, although maybe most of them would not get
22 through. Only one has to get through to destroy the city.
23 But to a reason which I think I understand as a member
24 of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, this committee knows
25 very little about that, the Armed Services Committee knows

very little about that, the Joint Atomic Committee in my opinion has been over the years an unwitting tool of the military.

There have been major changes as a result of Secretary Schlesinger going over there and now Mrs. Ray and so forth. But I think what we have to do, so that we can appreciate the problem that you face, the ultimate problem that you face, is to get this information out to the people so they understand the type and character of modernity. I think also it would save us millions of dollars in not buying equipment that is not essential to the security of the United States.

If there is any basic criticism, after 33 years in direct connection with the military that I have, it is their proneness to follow tradition as against modernity, especially if they won the last time.

So what I would ask you, do you feel you could help us? We try to develop a justification for that superb statement that you made in your summation of reporting to the people about the Middle East crisis, the basic problem of this nuclear holocaust danger and why.

Secretary Kissinger. I am very sympathetic to getting out the facts and I would have thought that with this effort one could put together enough from unclassified sources that one knows to be correct to present the essential facts. The Institute of Strategic Studies put out information. I

1 believe it has to be unclassified. I believe when one talks
2 of war now one is not talking about historic experience
3 anymore, it is a totally different type of thing, and the
4 responsibilities of having made that final step is one that
5 I don't see how one can justify before any tribunal short
6 of contingency very hard to perceive of.

7 Senator Symington. Well, do you think that, would you
8 lend your weight to this committee?--

9 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

10 Senator Symington. -- in trying to get that out?

11 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.

12 Senator Symington. Actually the whole thing is
13 a joke. Since the Smyth Report came out in the middle-'40s,
14 there has been no basic secrecy. We are not talking about
15 detail, we are talking about--

16 Secretary Kissinger. I think I could get my staff to
17 put together from unclassified sources enough of the essential
18 information and I would be very happy to cooperate with
19 the committee in putting out the facts on the military
20 situation as I understand it that confronts this Administration
21 and confronts any succeeding Administration when it faces
22 confrontation.

23 The Chairman. I want to endorse that, I think it is
24 very important, I do not think it is out at all.

25 Secretary Kissinger. It is out among experts.

1 The Chairman. But to the public.

2 Senator Symington. I have published quite a few facts
3 in the last few weeks but so far nobody has accused me of being
4 a traitor. I have no Ellsberg problem at this time. So I
5 think the time is right. When I first went on the Armed
6 Services Committee in '53, I went to the Chairman, no longer
7 in the Senate, and Senator Saltonstall and said I think we
8 ought to get into this if we are going to function as a
9 committee, and he was a great gentleman but he said, "It is so
10 secret I don't want to know anything about it." And I have
11 also had the same reaction later on when I tried to get
12 into it. This committee has tried to get into it, we
13 don't seem to be able to get the facts, we don't seem to
14 be able to marshal them. I am confident Secretary Schlesinger
15 who was Chairman of the AEC, whom I knew at that time, would
16 cooperate and I think it is so important that this
17 superb statement that you made be understood by all people,
18 and I would hope, that is the reason I say I started off by
19 saying I would ask for your help, I think it would clear up
20 a great many of your problems.

21 Secretary Kissinger. I would be delighted to cooperate.

22 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 Secretary Kissinger. I think it is important.

24 The Chairman. Senator Scott.

25 Senator Scott. No, sir, I won't use any time except

1 to say to the Secretary I was in a Judiciary Committee meeting
 2 and that is why I am late and I haven't heard the briefing.

3 Senator Percy. Secretary Kissinger, can we learn from
 4 this experience what went wrong with our intelligence we
 5 did not have more information? What happened to our intelligence
 6 assets in Syria and Egypt we did not know what was going on?

7 Secretary Kissinger. Well, Senator Percy, most
 8 intelligence Failures occur not in collecting facts but in
 9 interpreting the facts. We had the essential facts, we knew
 10 that the Syrian Army was in mobilized positions that were
 11 not typical of it. We knew that the Egyptian Army was
 12 mobilized. I was so disturbed by these reports on the Sunday
 13 before the war broke out that I took the unusual step of asking
 14 the Israeli Ambassador to call on me at the State Department
 15 and give me his interpretation and I relied on the fact that
 16 it is sort of common knowledge that Israeli intelligence is
 17 supposed to be the best in the world.

18 The Israeli Ambassador told me that there was no danger,
 19 no conceivable danger of attack, there was absolutely
 20 nothing to worry about. Nevertheless, I then asked our own
 21 intelligence agencies to give me their assessment and produce
 22 the horrible because I asked CIA and the State Department
 23 Intelligence people claim they had an exclusive right to
 24 brief me, so I got the State Department Intelligence
 25 to brief me in my State Department capacity and CIA to do a

1 paper for me as Assistant to the President and both papers
2 agreed on the fact there was no danger of a war. I had
3 that repeated twice more during the week. The facts were
4 all there. Why did they do it? One, because everybody
5 assumed the Israelis were so militarily supreme that it
6 would be total insanity for the Arabs to attack. That was
7 axiomatic.

8 Secondly, the Israelis in addition to their conviction
9 and their supremacy were so afraid that if they generated
10 the fear of war in this country that we would use it to
11 launch a diplomatic offensive that they have had a vested
12 interest in down-playing any danger of war and as late as
13 Thursday evening Eban told me, "We have never had it so good,
14 there is no danger of war, there is no need for diplomatic
15 offensive," and all of these things, it wasn't the lesson
16 to draw on intelligence, not that the factual collection
17 was wrong, but that if you don't challenge the basic
18 assumptions regularly by which they are interpreted, the
19 best facts in the world don't do you any good if you do not
20 have a professional devil's advocate there.

21 I had a vague uneasy feeling but I didn't mind being
22 reassured either and so if you do not have a professional
23 devil's advocate you just don't get it. There had been many
24 war scares and the Egyptians had mobilized on several other oc-
25 casions. This misassessment, incidentally, by the Israelis

1 of their position continued during the whole first week
2 and we were assured every day until Thursday of that week
3 that it would take them only two more days to clear the thing
4 up and we all know that this did not happen, which was
5 one reason why we did not feel all that urgency For resupply.
6 We figured whenever we started, it would be after the war.

7 So they have to assess theri own.

8 Another lesson one should draw, one should never assume
9 that any nation is incapable of learning to use complicated
10 equipment because one saw all of these weapons piled on the
11 Egyptian and Syrian side and the assumption was they never
12 knew how to use it so it didn't make any difference. That
13 is another lesson one should learn.

14 Senator Scott. Could I interrupt to say the assumption
15 seems to have been the Egyptians had not won a war since the
16 second act of Aida.

17 Senator Percy. Or the assumption is man will not
18 act irrationally and that is a false assumption.

19 Secretary Kissinger. I will tell you, for example,
20 everybody assumed, the day the war broke out we got
21 an official communication from the Israeli Government saying tha
22 by Tuesday night they would have it all cleaned up and,
23 therefore, pleading with us not to make any irrevocable
24 decisions in the Security Council that would keep them from
25 cleaning it up by Tuesday night.

1 We then thought they would be on the other side of
2 the Canal by then so we told the Security Council that we
3 felt that all parties should go back to the original starting
4 line. We thought this would have to be used probably more against
5 the Israelis as it turned out and was considered an anti-Arab
6 act because the Arabs were advancing at that time and then
7 we never put this in the resolution anyway because there
8 was no support for it.

9 So there were many misjudgments.

10 Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary, the President in his veto
11 message on the War Powers Resolution stated that if this
12 resolution had been law it might have impaired our ability to
13 respond to the Mid-East crisis.

14 Could you detail out for us how that resolution, if law,
15 would have impaired our ability to respond?

16 Secretary Kissinger. The problem is how other countries
17 would assess the necessity of a Congressional review.

18 After a certain period of time they would think they
19 can. There is a terminal date.

20 Senator Percy. Is the period of time too short or
21 particularly when you indicated you intended to come to
22 Congress very quickly anyway?

23 Secretary Kissinger. Well, the judgment that went into
24 this was that the other countries might then mistake the
25 permanence of whatever action might be taken.

1 Senator Percy. In the area of the notification to our
2 allies, could you tell the committee and our colleagues the
3 procedure that is established to be used to alert our
4 NATO allies, whether it is an instantaneous procedure as our
5 own alert to our own military forces, and what the time lag
6 was even though you had many conversations, obviously,
7 in the time we pushed the button to alert all of our forces
8 and the button was pushed to alert all of our allied forces.

9 Secretary Kissinger. Let me again make one very candid
10 observation here. We will make this an experiment whether
11 we can keep these executive sessions secret. One of our
12 problems in relation to NATO is the changed attitude of
13 Great Britain toward the United States since Britain joined
14 the Common Market. Many of our consultation procedures
15 with our allies have always operated on the assumption that
16 we would keep Britain most closely informed of all other
17 countries and that the British would then carry the ball
18 for us when we present the issues to our allies because
19 they will know the facts and they can then speak as Europeans
20 and they can sort of defend our positions.

21 Now, Ever since this summer the British have been
22 moving closer to the French position than toward their own
23 special relationship vis-a-vis us and it hasn't been as
24 abrasive as the French position but it has changed the
25 character of the special relationship and this has been

1 frankly one of the problems.

2 Now, I will send the Chairman all these exchanges. I
3 do not mind you showing them to the members of the committee
4 who are interested. I do not want to spread it into every
5 office. But I do not mind having it in the Chairman's
6 hands.

7 You will see that we talked to the British two or three
8 times a day. On the alert I called Lord Cromer within an
9 hour of receiving the letter. I told him of the facts. I
10 told him what we were thinking about. I said, "Please notify
11 London immediately and let us know if there are any problems."
12 He said, "Oh, this is an extremely serious matter. They
13 even have a copy of the letter." And we never heard any
14 complaint from them or any objection or any comment. He
15 said, "I don't assume that you have any choice here."

16 Now, we informed the military committee of NATO within
17 an hour of issuing the alert order. We informed the NATO
18 Council. There was a 2-hour time lag between our issuing
19 the orders and informing the NATO Council for this reason:
20 We did not want the NATO Council to hear what we were doing be-
21 fore we had given a formal reply to the Soviets so we timed
22 our briefing to the NATO Council for the exact moment that
23 we delivered our reply to the Soviets here, which meant it
24 was an hour before that reply reached Moscow, partly because
25 we thought the situation was so hairy that we should have our

1 alert underway before Moscow had our refusal to joint the
2 common Soviet-American force, lest they used the refusal to
3 trigger their force unilaterally, which is what they had
4 threatened us with.

5 Now this is a circumstance that is not likely to be
6 repeated. Normally we would notify NATO before we make an
7 alert. Moreover, this crisis was over, I mean the operational
8 part of the crisis was over within 12 hours. But this is the
9 procedure we followed. We told the British immediately, we
10 told the NATO Council at the precise moment that we delivered
11 the note to the Soviets, which was about 5:00 o'clock in
12 the morning here. In fact, we told the NATO Council before we
13 told the Congressional leaders, given the time difference,
14 with whom we met at 8:30 in the morning. So we faced a very
15 extraordinary circumstance here.

16 Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary, consistent with your
17 demonstrated desire to work with this committee closely
18 in foreign relation policy, and we deeply appreciate that, is
19 there anything further that we as individual members can
20 do to in moments of crisis lie this support and help our
21 common policy? I think many of us issue statements immediately.
22 I ordered mine. It was a gross miscalculation for the
23 Soviet Union to indicate that our domestic concerns would in any
24 way detract from our ability to unite solidly behind the
25

1 use? We use UP and AP. Do you have a desire to have
2 sent Marshall Wright copies of those immediately?

3 Secretary Kissinger. That would be extremely helpful
4 and I must say I have found the cooperation with this
5 committee--

6 Senator Percy. It should go both ways.

7 Secretary Kissinger. -- extremely helpful in this crisis
8 and if it isn't tempting fate I would like to say the Chairman
9 was enormously helpful with his intellectual and moral support
10 throughout all these days.

11 Senator Percy. Thank you very much.

12 The Chairman. Senator Pell.

13 Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 I would like to join in congratulating the Secretary
15 that he helped steer the ship of state through these very
16 difficult waters. He did a superior job.

17 I would like to follow up a little bit on Senator
18 Symington's thought on nuclear weapons. One of the things
19 that has always bothered me a little is the fact that the
20 public and even members of the Congress are not permitted
21 to know where nuclear weapons are, and in what nations they are
22 around the world, whereas the nations where they are know this
23 and the opposition knows it.

24 I was wondering if in the letter you were going to send
25 to Senator Symington and the Chairman, and hopefully all

of us, you could give thought to letting the American people in on this fact. Why shouldn't the American people know where there are nuclear weapons, for the sake of argument, in country X, if country X knows and the Soviet Union knows? What is the rationale for the secrecy?

Secretary Kissinger. Frankly that opposition pre-dates my term in office and I will find the rationale for it and defend it rationally the next time I am here.

Senator Pell. If you cannot defend it, maybe you can strip away some of this.

Secretary Kissinger. I hadn't intended to send a letter, I thought we would have a session here sometime in Executive Session in which we could discuss it and talk about it.

Senator Pell. I think it would be very helpful if you could even go a little further and give us some kind of memo enlarging on the unclassified facts as you were saying you thought would be prepared in your Department.

Secretary Kissinger. I will tell you candidly this particular reason for secrecy I have to look into, what the rationale is. It is clear the countries concerned know.

Senator Pell. I think the Department itself, instead of us trying to pluck out little classified nuggets occasionally, could come up with some kind of white paper or position paper as to what nuclear weaponry can do to the

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1 world, what is the effect.

2 One of the witnesses before us several years ago said
3 'as you say, mankind in the Northern Hemisphere --

4 Secretary Kissinger. It was a disaster of the nature
5 mankind has never suffered in recorded history anyway.

6 Senator Pell. I think it would be helpful if you
7 could send us perhaps some kind of unclassified paper. You
8 might want to throw that idea out. I would appreciate it.
9 We get things in confidence, they help us in our thinking
10 but still don't clarify the--

11 Secretary Kissinger. Let me talk to the Chairman to
12 see how we can conduct such a session in the near future.

13 Senator Pell. Along this question of nuclear weapons,
14 of the thoughts that occurred to me in connection with
15 Israel, while the public would not support the Hatfield
16 Amendments, if things got going very badly for Israel we
17 would be left with the unpleasant alternative to seeing
18 Israel put together its component parts for nuclear weapons
19 and seeing them use it, or I think most Americans would
20 prefer to see our own people being used rather than
21 development of a tripping of a nuclear holocaust of any sort.
22 Do you think this theory of mine has any justification?

23 Secretary Kissinger. Well, if Israel were on
24 the verge of collapse we would have some very tough decisions
25 to make and any country of two and a half million facing

1 one hundred million is in a very precarious position in a
2 war. If they do not win they are very apt to lose very
3 dramatically. They were in bad shape there for a while,
4 partly as a result, I don't know which of you gentlemen said
5 it, the countries that have won a war don't make their
6 adjustments as rapidly as they should, and the Israelis were
7 bemused by their victory in '67 to a point where they had
8 calculated all of the munitions expenditures on the basis of
9 a '67 type war.

10 Senator Pell. Do you feel in the case of survival they
11 do have the nuclear capability?

12 Secretary Kissinger. I do not want to speculate on that,
13 but I would assume that if their survival is threatened
14 they would use any capability they have.

15 Senator Pell. Supporting strongly objectives of avoiding
16 a nuclear holocaust, do you see any possibility of China
17 joining you in these efforts, have these subjects been
18 raised at all in your conversations?

19 Secretary Kissinger. Yes, but I do not think the
20 Chinese are ready yet.

21 The Chinese take the position that they would support
22 the abolition of all nuclear weapons but my estimate is
23 that what the Chinese consider the overwhelming problem is
24 to deter the Soviet Union from an attack on themselves
25 and, therefore, since they have so very few weapons, this

1 is my estimate, they have never said this to me, I think
2 they would be very reluctant to accept what they would
3 consider any international control of the few weapons they
4 have, but again the logic of history will force the
5 Chinese into the same position as us. They quote Mao's statement
6 that if 400 million Chinese die, there will still be 400 million
7 left. This is one of the bravado statements you can
8 do nothing about. No country has ever lost 400 million
9 people in two days and the collateral consequences of this
10 would be so unbelievable that it is nonsense to say that
11 after that you are going to operate your society with the
12 remaining 400, that it would be a new world for everybody
13 under those conditions.

14 Senator Pell. Finally, in connection with the crisis
15 of last week, while you have pretty well convinced us it was
16 a true crisis and real crisis, there is still a nagging
17 feeling in the American people that this may have been
18 orchestrated a little bit or exaggerated a little bit
19 because of the domestic problems.

20 Is there any possibility of releasing the note
21 from the Soviet Union? I know colleagues of mine have read
22 and apparently have seen it and they characterized it as
23 brutal. Why shouldn't that be released to clear the air?

24 Secretary Kissinger. If you will let me say one thing:
25 The domestic crisis which everyone here was aware of

1 occurred when I was in Moscow and it was not very fully
2 repoted there so that when I came back here on Tuesday
3 morning that crisis had passed me by.

4 Senator Pell. I am not connecting you with the crisis.
5 Secretary Kissinger. I know you are not connecting me
6 with it, but the only reason I mention it is because the
7 recommendation to the President was made by the body of men
8 in the National Security Council, none of whom had any domestic
9 policy responsibilities or had been in any way involved
10 in any of the discussions that led to it. Why don't we
11 release this note?

12 You will have noticed in my press conference I went
13 to great length avoiding the impression of confrontation.
14 I never mentioned Brezhnev. I never said what it was based
15 on. The reason Brezhnev's name got into it at all is because
16 the Pentagon for reasons which I have never undertood put
17 into the alert order a reference to a Brezhnev-Presidential
18 exchange and then, of course, it leaked out.

19 We do not think it is desirable to create a situation
20 in which it becomes part of the folklore that the President
21 faced down Brezhnev and that we had eyeball to eyeball
22 and all that business of '62, and I deliberately said we had
23 some ambiguous information which was a gross understatement,
24 in order to prevent this from happening.

25 I do not see any useful purpose being served, "I
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1 didn't see any useful purpose being served in getting this
2 letter out and proving that we made him pull back from
3 whatever threat was in the letter. What we would rather
4 aim for is to restore enough confidence in the public
5 and in the Congress that when Government takes steps, that
6 sort of measure, it may not be right but it has a very
7 good reason for doing it.

8 Senator Pell. Thank you.

9 I have one final questions, something extraneous,
10 if-the Chairman will permit, on another subject.

11 The Senate by an 82 to 10 vote passed a recommendation
12 we engage in an anti-environmental warfare treaty and the
13 Department, I believe, is supporting it and the Pentagon
14 is opposed to it. I wonder if you could direct your offices
15 to look into what the reason for the delay is in giving
16 some kind of responsibility to the will of Congress and
17 the will of the Senate in this regard?

18 Secretary Kissinger. Let me look into this. I know
19 we are generally sympathetic. I do not know what the real
20 obstacles are.

21 Senator Griffin. I just join in commending the Secretary
22 for the excellent job he has done and for the development
23 of such good relationship with this committee and I hope
24 that it continues.

25 The Chairman. Senator McGovern.

1 Senator McGovern. In view of the lateness of the hour,
2 I will follow the good example of Senator Griffin. I am
3 impressed with the Secretary's presentation here this morning
4 and greatly reassured. I thought it was a very, very impressive
5 presentation.

6 Secretary Kissinger. Thank you.

7 Senator Scott. I just want to thank the Secretary
8 and wish I had been able to hear all of it.

9 Senator Javits. May I ask one thing of the Secretary?
10 He has been very generous with his suggesting we get
11 together on other occasions. My experience in Europe with
12 John Sparkman and Mike Mansfield shows a very serious
13 situation, Mr. Secretary. It is not an immediate confrontation.
14 May I respectfully suggest that this is an ideal place
15 for advice and consent and that if you gave us enough
16 notice we could get prepared, too. There are some very
17 good brains around this table, that means going two ways.

18 Secretary Kissinger. I would welcome this. Why
19 don't we do it, if the Chairman agrees. I will be back
20 here November 15 or 16. Within a week or two of my return.

21 Senator Javits. Thank you.

22 Secretary Kissinger. Before the end of the month.
23 I would welcome this because this is one of our most
24 complex problems.

25 Senator Javits. Thank you.

1 The Chairman. The Secretary has been most forthcoming,
2 I think, both here and at other meetings and he certainly
3 has gone to great lengths to communicate with me, which
4 I appreciate, and in the name of the committee and, of
5 course, I join my colleagues in commending you on the
6 way you have handled this matter.

7 I will just say one or two other things.

8 I do not want to go into this because I know the time is
9 late. One thought is future staff could explore with
10 the Russians, they are the other greatest nuclear power, the
11 possibility of a sort of joint statement about this overall
12 nuclear capability and so on. I think this thing Senator
13 Symington raised is necessary for the education of our
14 own people and perhaps one in which they might join. It
15 isn't any great secret. In your own negotiations we
16 all know each knows what the other one has. That was
17 evident at the discussions of the interim agreements and it
18 might be a very impressive educational venture and would
19 give much better perspective to some of these individual
20 cases that arise.

21 That is the way I feel about it. They do not take
22 it seriously, detente, which you discussed so well in the
23 beginning.

24 I think you have done a great job in this committee,
25 now our question is how to educate everybody, I mean beyond
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1 the committee.

2 Unfortunately I think it is a shame under our
3 situation we could not have this in public, it would be
4 very informative to the whole public, but I understand
5 the reasons why. I think there has to be a way to inform
6 all of the other members of the Congress as well as the
7 public.

8 So I hope your staff will give some thought to that
9 while you are journeying to Peking.--maybe as soon as you
10 get back. And there is one other problem we have not
11 mentioned. I do not want to go into it now. That is the
12 disposition of the Palestinian question, which is going to
13 remain one of the very difficult and thorny ones which
14 we will discuss at a later date.

15 Thank you very much. Everybody knows this is
16 an executive session and be very careful what you say to
17 the press, leave it in general terms. I know you have to
18 say something but keep it very general and do not do anything
19 to embarrass these hearings because they are very useful. We
20 do not want anything to interrupt the possibility of
21 continuing these.

22 Senator Sparkman. We will refer them to the
23 Chairman.

24 The Chairman. Everybody be careful.

25 (Whereupon, at 12:15 o'clock p.m., the committee
adjourned.)